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Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note
Stephen J. Morse*
This brief diagnostic note identifies a cognitive pathology, “Brain Overclaim
Syndrome [BOS],” that often afflicts those inflamed by the fascinating new
discoveries in the neurosciences. It begins by suggesting how one should think
about the relation of neuroscience (or any other material explanation of human
behavior) to criminal responsibility, distinguishing between internal and external
critiques based on neuroscience. It then describes the signs and symptoms of BOS,
the essential feature of which is to make claims about the implications of
neuroscience for criminal responsibility that cannot be conceptually or empirically
sustained. It then applies the diagnostic lens of BOS to the claims in Roper v.
Simmons. Finally, the article recommends Cognitive Jurotherapy [CJ] as the
therapy of choice for BOS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brains do not commit crimes; people commit crimes. This conclusion should
be self-evident, but, infected and inflamed by stunning advances in our
understanding of the brain, advocates all too often make moral and legal claims
that the new neuroscience does not entail and cannot sustain. Particular brain
findings are thought to lead inevitably to moral or legal conclusions. Brains are
blamed for offenses; agency and responsibility disappear from the legal landscape.
For example, in Roper v. Simmons,1 advocates for abolition of the death penalty for
adolescents who committed murder when they were sixteen or seventeen years old
argued that the demonstrated lack of complete myelination of the cortical neurons
of the adolescent brain was reason to believe that sixteen and seventeen year old
murderers were insufficiently responsible to deserve capital punishment. These
types of responses, I claim, are the signs of a disorder that I have preliminarily
entitled Brain Overclaim Syndrome [BOS].
This brief diagnostic note first lays the contextual foundation for how one
should think about the relation of neuroscience to criminal responsibility. Then it
attempts to identify the nature of the pathology, to offer the criteria for the
*

Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law & Professor of Psychology and Law in
Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania. This diagnostic investigation was first reported at a
conference on the mind of a child held at the Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University in
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1
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diagnosis, to evaluate the disorder in the Roper arguments, and to suggest the route
to total cure. Footnotes will be scarce. Most of this note is an extended conceptual
argument or based on this investigator’s first-hand clinical observations. Where it
depends on assertions about the state of the science, it takes positions, albeit
sometimes controversial, that have strong support. Trust me: I’m a doctor (of
psychology).
II. DECLARATION OF INTEREST
Many journals in psychiatry and medicine now ask authors to include a
“declaration of interest” to indicate possible conflicts of interests or other
influences on the author’s conclusions. For example, sources of support for the
research should be disclosed. As a diagnostic investigator and in the spirit of
disclosure, please permit me to list the most important philosophical, moral and
legal commitments with which I approach this investigation. First, I am a
thorough-going, matter-up materialist who believes that all mental and behavioral
activity is the causal product of lawful physical events in the brain. Second, I am a
non-reductive materialist who believes, roughly, with John Searle and many
others, that conscious mental states are real, that they are caused by lower level
biological processes in the brain, that conscious states are realized in the brain—
the mind-brain—but not at the level of neurons, and that conscious states can be
causally efficacious.2 Third, I am a compatibilist who believes that moral and
criminal responsibility are compatible with determinism or universal causation.
Fourth, I believe that desert is a necessary condition of just punishment under
current law and that it should be at least a partial justification for the fair
imposition of punishment under any proposed criminal law. Last, I oppose the
death penalty.
III. THINKING ABOUT NEUROSCIENCE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
This section considers the logical and conceptual space in which claims about
the relation of neuroscience to responsibility can arise.
To think sensibly about the relation of any other variable—whether that
variable is biological, psychological, sociological, or astrological—to criminal
responsibility first requires that one have an account of criminal responsibility.
After all, one cannot relate two variables to one another unless one has a definition
of both. Assuming that one has a definition of criminal responsibility, then the
argument based on the other variable may be either internal or external. An
internal argument accepts that criminal responsibility is a coherent concept and
uses the other variable to explain the positive rules and practices we have or to
criticize those rules and practices normatively for the purpose of improving them.
2

JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 113–14 (2004) (terming his position about
consciousness “biological naturalism”).
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An external argument uses the other variable to demonstrate that the concept of
criminal responsibility is incoherent or unjustifiable and therefore it should be
abandoned. Thus, any commentator who accepts that at least some people who
commit crimes are responsible and may justifiably be punished are necessarily
making an internal argument, at least implicitly, because the justifiability of
responsibility is assumed.
A. A Positive Account of Criminal Responsibility
As a matter of current, positive common law, an agent will be prima facie
criminally responsible if the agent acts intentionally and with the appropriate
mental state, the mens rea, required by the definition of the offense, such as
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. Criminal law typically defines
an act as an intentional bodily movement performed by an agent whose
consciousness is reasonably intact. Mental states have their ordinary language,
common-sense meanings. If the agent does not act at all because the bodily
movement was not intentional or the agent’s consciousness was substantially
compromised, the agent is not prima facie responsible. Similarly, if the agent
lacks a requisite mental state, the agent is also not prima facie criminally
responsible. Even if the agent is fully prima facie responsible, however, the agent
ultimately may still not be criminally responsible if an excusing condition, an
affirmative defense, such as legal insanity (essentially a rationality defect) or
duress (a compelling “hard choice” situation, such as a “do-it-or-else” threat at
gunpoint) was present when the agent committed the offense. A defendant who
wants to avoid imputation of criminal responsibility must create reasonable doubt
about whether he or she acted intentionally, consciously and with the required
mens rea, or the defendant must establish an affirmative defense. Although one
might quibble about details, I believe that this account accurately reflects the law’s
current conception of criminal responsibility.
The concept of the responsible legal person implicit in this account is an
intentional, reasonably fully conscious and potentially rational agent who is not
exposed to an unreasonably hard choice about whether to offend. The specific
criteria for prima facie responsibility and excuse are all behavioral, broadly
conceived as conduct and mental states. The causes for the behavioral criteria are
not part of the criteria themselves. For example, an agent’s capacity for rationality
might be diminished by faulty neurotransmitters, psychological stress, trauma, or a
host of other causes. The excusing condition is the lack of rational capacity.
The underlying biological, psychological, sociological, and astrological
causes for any of the criteria for criminal responsibility, including mental states,
can be nothing more than evidentiary support for the assertion that the criterion in
question was in fact satisfied at the time of the crime. Causation cannot be an
excuse per se for an internalist, who accepts responsibility, because all behavior is
caused and thus all behavior would have to be excused. I have termed the
erroneous belief to the contrary the “fundamental psycholegal error.” It is as
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erroneous when the postulated cause of behavior is neurological as when it is
psychological, sociological, or astrological.
Once one has assumed that
responsibility is possible, causation cannot excuse per se.
All the criteria for criminal responsibility are normative. The meaning of
rationality and how much rational capacity must be present for responsibility, for
example, are legal issues that the law must decide. Other disciplines might provide
potentially relevant knowledge about human behavioral capacities, but the other,
empirical disciplines must fall silent about the ultimate criteria the law adopts. No
general finding from any other discipline entails any general legal conclusion
about legal responsibility unless it conclusively undermines the possibility of
responsibility at all, in which case it is the basis for an external rather than an
internal critique. Moreover, demonstrable differences among people or groups of
people concerning the criteria do not mean that the law must treat them differently.
For example, one person may be more rational than another, but they both may be
rational enough to deserve the same punishment for the same crime committed
under similar circumstances. No normative differences are logically entailed by
behavioral differences unless, counter-factually to reality, the behavioral
differences precisely track the normative differences.
Finally, we assess all the criminal law’s behavioral criteria for responsibility
primarily by considering evidence of the defendant’s conduct, including speech
acts, and drawing inferences from that conduct. Based on the behavioral evidence,
it seems patently obvious, and few commentators disagree, that most agents who
appear to violate criminal prohibitions act intentionally, consciously, with the
requisite mens rea, possess the capacity for rationality (by any sensible standard),
and do not act under a hard choice threat.
B. Internal Arguments: Neuroscience and the Assessment of Criminal
Responsibility
The new neuroscience might logically assist assessment of criminal
responsibility in specific cases and in general. In specific cases, we will virtually
never have direct neuroscientific evidence contemporaneous with the time of the
crime. At most, we will have ex ante or ex post evidence that can produce
inferences of varying validity about brain structure and function at the time of the
crime. Moreover, at present, neuroscience is insufficiently advanced to offer
precise data that will be genuinely legally relevant. Thus, even if the science is
good enough to pass muster for admission as expert scientific evidence under
federal and state evidentiary rules, it may still be inadmissible because it will not
be probative. As neuroscience advances, it may become probative in a wider class
of cases, but we have not yet reached this stage.
Despite the foregoing qualifications, neuroscience evidence may be relevant
in two classes of specific cases. First, in cases in which the behavioral evidence
concerning prima facie liability or an affirmative defense seems clear,
neuroscientific evidence may demonstrate that appearances are deceptive. For
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example, neuroscience might indicate that a defendant who appeared to have been
acting consciously was in fact acting in an unconscious or automatic state, such as
sleepwalking or in the wake of physical trauma. Or, neuroscience might indicate
that an apparently entirely rational defendant lacked the capacity for rationality. I
speculate that such cases will be rare. Further, when the behavioral evidence is
clear and the potentially conflicting neuroscience will be inevitably speculative to
a greater or lesser degree, common sense dictates that we should believe the
behavioral evidence rather than the neuroscience evidence because the criteria for
responsibility are behavioral. Still, this is a logical possibility.
A second class of specific cases involves those in which the behavioral
evidence is in doubt. For example, suppose the defendant had received a blow to
the head not long before committing an offense and whether the defendant acted
consciously is unclear. Neuroscience will rarely be dispositive in such cases
because the relation of the brain to complex behavior is itself immensely complex
and beyond all but the most general current understanding. Nonetheless, in some
cases valid neuroscience will help the finder of fact resolve the legal issue,
although caution must always be exercised because the neuroscientific evidence
often will not be sufficiently contemporaneous to permit valid inferences about the
time of the crime. Such cases may arise relatively frequently, especially as
advances in neuroscience allow more precise specification of how the brain affects
behavior. I do not know how large this class of cases is, but it is surely
considerably larger than the first class.
Neuroscience might be relevant in general if its findings demonstrate that the
current criteria for criminal responsibility are unjust because they do not comport
with our biologically-based understanding of behavior. For example, some claim
that the number of defendants who do not meet the criminal law’s current criteria
for conscious action is much larger than we believe. This type of claim goes far
beyond the argument that neuroscience will be relevant in large numbers of
specific cases. It may suggest that the law’s criteria are too narrow generally and
must be normatively reformed to be just. Such claims would of course be hard to
support if the behavioral evidence were clearly to the contrary. What kind of
neuroscience evidence would it take to convince us that when we act, most of the
time most of us are not conscious (according to any sensible standard of
consciousness)?
C. External Arguments: Criminal Responsibility Rejected
At the extreme, claims about the general implications of neuroscience may
cease to be the basis of a normative critique of criminal responsibility conceptions
and may become an external critique of the coherence or justice of the possibility
of responsibility tout court. Two types of external criticism are possible. First, the
externalist might claim that responsibility is impossible because its criteria are
based on a conception of human action that is simply wrong. We are not the type
of creatures we take ourselves to be. For example, suppose, despite all common-
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sense first-person and third-person evidence to the contrary, neuroscience could
show that all human conduct is done in a state indistinguishable from spasm or
sleepwalking, or, more extravagantly, that we do not have mental states at all. In a
word, suppose neuroscience could demonstrate conclusively that all of us all the
time are automatons or without any mental life whatsoever and that thinking
otherwise is simply an illusion. In the philosophy of mind, such arguments are
associated with various forms of reductive or eliminative materialism.
No current conception of responsibility that would support imposing deserved
blame and punishment can accept blaming and punishing those who act
automatically or creatures that have no mental life. If this were really the case,
rationality would demand that the criminal law would have to abandon any robust
notion of responsibility and seek alternative means of ordering human affairs and
protecting society. (One might ask whether automatons or creatures without minds
can rationally decide how to respond to their own status as automatons, but let us
leave this question for another day.)
The second type of external critique accepts that we are the types of
intentional, conscious, potentially rational creatures that we take ourselves to be, a
position associated with various forms of non-reductive materialism in the
philosophy of mind. But the second external critique denies that anyone can be
genuinely responsible because neuroscience and other disciplines conclusively
demonstrate that all our actions are mechanistically determined and determinism
(or universal causation or some such) is incompatible with ultimate responsibility.
In the philosophy of responsibility, this position is termed “incompatibilism.” This
is a perfectly respectable conceptual position, but it cannot be proven
metaphysically or normatively to be right. Many thorough-going naturalists, such
as myself, who believe that all the phenomena of the universe are causally
explicable by natural physical laws, believe that responsibility is compatible with
determinism, a position termed “compatibilism.” Indeed, compatibilism is
probably the dominant position among philosophers of responsibility. It is surely
the position that best explains our responsibility practices, which hold some people
accountable but excuse others. Science cannot resolve the dispute because the
issue is metaphysical and normative and it is unlikely ever to be resolved by logic.
Finally, proponents of deterministic type arguments cannot have it both ways.
They must either accept jettisoning any responsibility for anyone or they must
recognize that determinism, which is not selective or partial, is not a criterion that
bears on responsibility.
In conclusion, the first type of external critique fundamentally denies our
ordinary understanding of ourselves and is conceivably demonstrable by scientific
findings. Until it does so, however, it is unlikely to undermine the powerful sense
we all have of the efficacy and importance of mental states and reason. The
second external critique is also unlikely to be successful because many people, the
compatibilists, believe already that it is just to hold others responsible despite the
belief that determinism or universal causation is true. Some day, an external
critique may convince us to abandon criminal responsibility, but for now such
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arguments are academic in the most literal sense. Only internal critiques have a
chance on the ground.
Now that we have explored generally the logical relation between brain
explanations and criminal responsibility, let us turn to the errors that are the signs
and symptoms of Brain Overclaim Syndrome.
IV. BRAIN OVERCLAIM SYNDROME: THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS
New, powerful scientific findings about the correlates and causes of behavior
often have a potent and, alas, rationality-unhinging effect on the thinking of
Potential Commentators [PCs]. Most flow from misunderstanding the relation
between brains and responsibility that the last section considered. This section
attempts to catalogue those effects that I have identified to date, many of which are
related to each other, but the list has no pretensions to being complete. After all,
this is a preliminary diagnostic investigation and future investigators may discover
hitherto unidentified signs and symptoms. The final pathway in all cases,
however, is that more legal implications are claimed for the brain science than can
be justified.
A. Confusion About the Relation Between Brain and Complex, Intentional Action
For a materialist, the brain always plays a causal role in behavior. Despite all
the astonishing recent advances in neuroscience, however, we still know woefully
little about how the brain enables the mind, and especially about how
consciousness and intentionality can arise from the complicated hunk of matter
that is the brain. At a recent conference on the abnormal brain, the eminent
philosopher of mind and action, John Searle, opened his keynote speech by telling
the following anecdote.3 Some years ago, Searle said, he decided to learn what the
new neuroscience had to teach about the relation of brain to mind and action. He
devoured the most important texts only to be dismayed that these texts did not all
begin with a disclaimer that we do not know much about this relation yet. Just so.
Brain imaging studies have been the most potent pathogen causing BOS, so it
is useful to say a few words about such studies. Imaging is at present very
expensive and requires carefully chosen and cooperative subjects. Consequently,
the number of experimental subjects and controls in any study tends to be small
and precise replications are infrequent. The problem of small samples will
probably be remedied by advances in the efficiency of the technology of
imaging—indeed, this is already happening for readings of activity at the surface
of the brain—but for now it is a dominant feature of imaging studies.
Statistically valid findings are based on mean differences and do not imply
that there is an absolutely clear distinction between the experimental and control
3

John Searle, Keynote Address at the Arizona State University College of Law Conference:
The Abnormal Brain and Criminal Responsibility (Apr. 29, 2005).
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groups. Usually there is substantial overlap, meaning that some individual
experimental brains look like individual control brains and vice versa. For
example, suppose the experimental hypothesis is that task X will cause brain
region Y to be activated. After controlling for other variables that might cause Y
to be activated in both the experimental and control conditions (the “subtraction”
method), the investigators discover that there is still a difference: Y is activated
statistically significantly more in the experimental subjects. Nonetheless, some
experimental subjects will not have Y activated by X and some control subjects
will. Therefore, one could not predict perfectly from the brain image whether the
subject was an experimental or a control. The question would always be how
much overlap there was between the two groups. The greater the overlap, the more
difficult it would be to predict that subject’s experimental or control status from
the image.4
Discovering the neural correlates of mental phenomena does not tell us how
these phenomena are possible. For example, we may be able to identify the neural
correlates of consciousness, but we do not have a clue about how those parts of the
brain make subjective experience possible. Moreover, the causation of virtually
any complex behavior is affected by psychological and sociological variables, even
when brain causation has been identified. For example, the brains of late
adolescents are almost certainly the same around the globe—holding nutrition and
the like constant—but the rates of behaviors associated with immature adolescent
brains, such as impulsive criminality, vary widely from place to place and from
time to time. Monolithic brain explanation of complex behavior is almost always
radically incomplete.
Certain lesions can of course disable various human capacities, but few
criminal responsibility cases in which the result is not already obvious based on
behavioral evidence will involve a precise, identifiable neurological mechanism
that will demonstrate that criminal responsibility was not present. Further, current
neuroscience cannot begin to demonstrate that our view of ourselves as generally
conscious, intentional, and potentially rational agents is false.
Until we know vastly more than we do now, in most cases we will not be in a
position to add much to assessing responsibility behaviorally in individual cases,
and even less do we have the resources to mount a potentially convincing external
4

At the conference at which this diagnostic note was first presented, I asked with what
accuracy, based only on the images of myelination, one could accurately distinguish the individual
brains of sixteen and seventeen year olds on the one hand and eighteen and nineteen year olds on the
other. One neuroscientist claimed that the scientist could do this with great accuracy if the scientist
were furnished with the sex and handedness of the subject. This claim would have been quite
believable if the comparison groups were thirteen and fourteen year olds versus twenty-five and
twenty-six year olds, but it seemed doubtful to me because development is continuous and the groups
were so close in age. After the conference, I therefore asked the question of other equally
credentialed and experienced neuroscientists and neuroanatomists. My informants uniformly agreed
that they could not very accurately distinguish sixteen and seventeen year old brains from eighteen
and nineteen year old brains. I do not know who is right. To the best of my knowledge, a study to
determine accuracy of this type has not been performed, but the outcome would be very interesting.
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critique of responsibility vel non. In individual cases in which neuroscientific
findings could be demonstrated to be genuinely relevant and probative, they should
of course be admissible consistent with the usual evidentiary standards for
scientific evidence.
B. The Confusion of Internal and External Critiques
Causation is not per se an excusing condition and partial causation does not
exist. If this is a causal world, as neuroscientists and I believe, then all phenomena
are fully caused by their necessary and sufficient causal conditions. Partial
knowledge about causation does not mean that there is partial causation.
Causation is also not the equivalent of being subjected to compulsion, which exists
when the agent is non-culpably faced with a normative hard choice. All behavior
is caused, but not all behavior results from a threat at gunpoint or the equivalent.
And to think that causation per se excuses is an external critique. If causation
excuses per se or is the equivalent of compulsion, responsibility as we know it is
impossible. As an argument from within our responsibility practices, it is the
fundamental psycholegal error to argue that causation excuses. The discovery that
the brain, including a brain abnormality, played some causal role in the production
of what is undeniably human action does not lead to any legal conclusions about
responsibility. The proper internal question is whether the neuroscience evidence
helps to establish the presence or absence of action, mental states or a genuine
affirmative defense, such as lack of rational capacity.
C. Misunderstanding the Criteria for Responsibility
The criteria for responsibility are behavioral and normative, not empirically
demonstrable states of the brain. Even if there were a perfect correlation between
brain states and the behavioral criteria for responsibility, the brain states would be
nothing more than evidence of the behavioral states. Such a correlation is a
fantasy based on present knowledge and probably always will be when we are
considering complex human actions. If the person meets the behavioral criteria for
responsibility, the person should be held responsible, whatever the brain evidence
may indicate, such as the presence of an abnormality. If the person does not meet
the behavioral criteria, the person should be held not responsible, however normal
the brain may look. Brains are not held responsible. Acting people are. To
believe that brain evidence has more than simple evidentiary value for assessing
responsibility is to misconceive the criteria for responsibility.
One could claim, of course, that normatively the law should adopt brain-based
criteria for responsibility, but this would be a category mistake. Even if it is not, it
amounts to an external critique. In the alternative, one could argue that the
positive account of responsibility that I have presented is fundamentally incorrect
and that the brain science is more relevant to the properly understood criteria of
responsibility. Perhaps so, but this requires an argument to demonstrate that the
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account is wrong. Finally, one could argue that the behavioral and normative
criteria should be different as a result of what we have learned from brain science
and other disciplines. This would be an internal critique that would depend on a
normative argument about the relevance of brain science to responsibility. If this
argument went through, however, it would not undermine this diagnostic note’s
claims about the relevance of brain science to current, positive responsibility
criteria, and, even then, the brain science would still be relevant only as evidence
concerning the new, improved behavioral responsibility criteria.
D. The Confusion of the Normative and the Positive
Factual behavioral differences between people do not entail the necessity of
differential legal treatment unless one is operating under a normative theory that
indicates why the factual difference should make a legal difference. I am not
suggesting that it is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is,” a contentious
issue most famously addressed by David Hume. I am agnostic about this. I am
claiming, however, that one cannot assume an “ought” from an “is.” This requires
an argument.
Suppose that we can reliably identify valid group differences, say, between
men and women on measures of upper body strength, a capacity useful in some
occupations, such as fighting fires. Should the ranks of firefighters be limited to
men? Of course not, because we might decide that values of equality trump those
of efficiency or because we think that we can individualize decisions about an
applicant’s ability to do the job. Even if proportionately fewer women might
qualify, some surely will, and we would not be able to predict whether an applicant
could do the job based solely on sex. Virtually no finding, no practice, however
hoary, necessarily entails any normative outcome without an argument about why
it should. This is as true of neuroscience evidence as of any other kind of scientific
evidence. Neuroscience evidence may provide premises in normative arguments,
but it does not alone entail conclusions. To think otherwise is to confuse the
positive with the normative.
In conclusion, based on the foregoing confusions and others that may be
identified, the final pathway, the final expression of BOS is to make claims about
the relation of the brain to responsibility that cannot be sustained logically or
empirically.
V. EVALUATING ROPER
Few if any responsible commentators who accept the coherence and validity
of criminal responsibility ascriptions—the internalists—claim that most adolescent
offenders commit their crimes in automatic states or without mens rea. Crimes
committed impulsively, for example, are still committed consciously and
intentionally. Nor do most commentators claim that late adolescent offenders do
not know the nature and quality of their acts, do not know their acts are wrong, or
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act in response to duress. No evidence from the behavioral or neurosciences even
hints that the contrary might be true. Rather, the claim is that culpable adolescents,
whose behavior meets the prima facie case for guilt and who do not have an
affirmative defense, are nonetheless less criminally responsible because they have
insufficiently developed rationality. Thus, to be relevant, any evidence must be
addressed to the sixteen and seventeen year olds’ capacity for rationality, broadly
speaking.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,5 the Supreme Court barred capital punishment of
murderers who killed when they were fifteen years old or younger, and in Atkins v.
Virginia,6 the high Court categorically prohibited capital punishment of convicted
killers with mental retardation. Although the Court provided many reasons for its
Thompson and Atkins holdings, crucial to both was the conclusion that younger
adolescents and persons with retardation are categorically less culpable, less
responsible, and therefore do not deserve capital punishment. The operative
language in Atkins concerning culpability and responsibility is instructive. The
Court wrote:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right
and wrong . . . . Because of their impairments, however, by definition
they have diminished capacities to understand and process information,
to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others . . . . Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
....
With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender
gets his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender.7
All the criteria the Court mentions are behavioral (broadly understood to refer to
cognitive and “control” functioning8) and their relevance to criminal responsibility
is based on the relation to desert.
Advocates of abolition in Roper seized on this language to make similar
arguments concerning sixteen and seventeen year old murderers. Although
apparently normal adolescents do not suffer from abnormal impairments, lack of
full developmental maturation allegedly distinguishes them from adults on
5
6
7

487 U.S. 815 (1988).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).

Id. at 318–19; see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834−35.
I put “control” in scare quotes because I am highly skeptical about claims concerning lack
of control as an independent mitigating or excusing condition. I argue that lack of control can always
be reduced to a cognitive deficiency. Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People,
88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1054−63 (2002).
8
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behavioral dimensions, such as the capacity for judgment, that are relevant to
rationality and therefore to responsibility and desert.
What was striking and new about the argument in Roper, however, was that
advocates of abolition used newly discovered neuroscientific evidence concerning
the adolescent brain to bolster their argument that sixteen and seventeen year old
killers do not deserve to die. Editorial pages encouraged the High Court to
consider the neuroscientific evidence to help it reach its decision. Although
neuroscience evidence had been adduced in earlier, high profile cases, such as the
1982 prosecution of John Hinckley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President
Reagan and others, Roper has been the most important case to propose use of the
new neuroscience to affect responsibility questions generally. Indeed, the
American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association, among
others, all filed or subscribed to amicus briefs urging abolition based in part on the
neuroscience findings. The real question was whether and how the new
neuroscience was relevant to responsibility ascriptions and just punishment for
adolescent offenders (or anyone else).
Here is the opening of the summary of the amicus brief filed by, inter alia, the
American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law: “The adolescent’s mind works differently
from ours. Parents know it. This Court [the United States Supreme Court] has
said it. Legislatures have presumed it for decades or more.”9
Precisely. The brief points to evidence concerning impulsivity, poor short
term risk and long term benefit estimations, emotional volatility, and susceptibility
to stress among adolescents compared to adults. These are common sense,
“fireside” conclusions that parents and others have drawn in one form or another
since time immemorial. In recent years, common sense has been bolstered by
methodologically rigorous behavioral investigations that have confirmed ordinary
wisdom. Most important, all these behavioral characteristics are clearly relevant to
responsibility because they all bear on the adolescent’s capacity for rationality.
Without any further scientific evidence, advocates of abolition would have an
entirely ample factual basis to support the types of moral and constitutional claims
they made.
The Roper briefs were filled with discussion of new neuroscientific evidence
that confirms that adolescent brains are different from adult brains in ways
consistent with the observed behavioral differences that alone bear on culpability
and responsibility. Assuming the validity of the neuroscientific evidence, what
does it add? The rigorous behavioral studies already confirm the behavioral
differences. No one thinks that these data are invalid because adolescent subjects
are faking or for some other reason. The moral and constitutional implications of
9
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the data may be controversial, but the data are not. At most, the neuroscientific
evidence provides a partial causal explanation of why the observed behavioral
differences exist and thus some further evidence of the validity of the behavioral
differences. It is only of limited and indirect relevance to responsibility
assessment, which is based on behavioral criteria.
Advocates claimed, however, that the neuroscience confirmed that
adolescents are insufficiently responsible to be executed, thus confusing the
positive and the normative. The neuroscience evidence in no way independently
confirms that adolescents are less responsible. If the behavioral differences
between adolescents and adults were slight, it would not matter if their brains are
quite different. Similarly, if the behavioral differences were sufficient for moral
and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not matter if the brains were
essentially indistinguishable.
Decisions regarding whether the mean differences are large enough and
whether the overlap between the two populations is small enough to warrant
treating adolescents differently categorically as a class rather than trying to
individuate responsibility are normative, moral, political, social, and ultimately
legal constitutional questions about which behavioral and neuroscience must
finally fall silent. Even if there were virtually no behavioral or brain overlaps
between, say, sixteen and seventeen year olds on the one hand and eighteen and
nineteen year olds on the other, it would still not entail that we must categorize
rather than individuate. After all, because there is overlap—indeed, substantial
overlap in the groups just mentioned—we know that some sixteen and seventeen
years olds will be behaviorally and neurologically indistinguishable from many
eighteen and nineteen year olds. Finally, even if there were no behavioral or brain
overlap whatsoever, it would still not entail that abolition was constitutionally
mandated. As a normative matter, the Court could decide that sixteen and
seventeen year olds are responsible enough to be executed despite all of them
being less responsible than older murderers. Assuming the validity of the findings
of behavioral and biological difference, the size of that difference entails no
necessary moral or constitutional conclusions.
In the event, the Roper majority cited many reasons for its decision, including
the abundant common sense and behavioral science evidence that adolescents
differ from adults. This evidence demonstrates, said the Court, “that juvenile
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders,” for
whom capital punishment is reserved. The Court cited three differences:
adolescents have “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility;”10 adolescents are more “vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” a difference in part
explained by the adolescent’s weaker control or experience of control over his or
her own environment; adolescents do not have fully formed characters.11 As a
10
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result of these factors—all of which, we may note, are behavioral and all of which
can be confirmed with behavioral evidence alone—juvenile culpability is
diminished and the penological justifications for capital punishment apply to
adolescents with “lesser force.”12 The Court’s opinion thus reflects two
conclusions: the group difference between the rationality of late adolescents and of
adults is constitutionally significant for Eighth Amendment purposes and it is large
enough to justify abandoning individualized decision-making concerning
responsibility for the former.
Characteristically, the Court did not cite much evidence for the empirical
propositions that supported its diminished culpability argument. What is notable,
however, is that the Court did not cite any of the neuroscience evidence concerning
myelination and pruning that the amici and others had urged them to rely on. It did
cite six behavioral sources, five of which were high quality behavioral science.
Perhaps the neuroscience evidence actually played a role in the decision, as many
advocates for the use of neuroscience would like to believe, but there is no
evidence in the opinion to support this speculation.
As this note has argued, the behavioral science was crucial to proper
resolution of the case and furnished completely adequate resources to decide the
issue. The neuroscience was largely irrelevant. The reasoning of the case is
consistent with this argument and the opinion showed no signs of Brain Overclaim
Syndrome. In my view, Roper properly disregarded the neuroscience evidence and
thus did not provide unwarranted legitimation for the use of such evidence to
decide culpability questions generally.
VI. THE ROYAL ROAD TO COMPLETE RECOVERY:
COGNITIVE-JUROTHERAPY [CJ] FOR BOS
The signs and symptoms of BOS are all cognitive. I therefore propose that CJ
is likely to be the best treatment. The therapeutic techniques, all of which require
motivation, effort and practice, follow directly from the signs and symptoms of
BOS.
First, the Potential Commentator [PC] must have a good understanding of the
relevance of the new neuroscience to complex behavior generally, including an
understanding of the relevant literature in philosophy of mind. Reasonable minds
can differ about the basic neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, of course, and
disagreement is not a sign of BOS. But naive neuroscience and philosophy of
mind and question-begging about these subjects are signs, although they are
completely curable.
Second, the PC must understand whether his or her contribution is an internal
or external criticism, and what type it is within the two broad domains. Confusion
between and within the critical domains must at all costs be avoided. This is also
simple enough if one understands the distinctions.
12

Id. at 571.

2006]

BRAIN OVERCLAIM SYNDROME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

411

Third, the PC must be very clear about precisely what criteria for criminal
responsibility he or she is using and about whether it is a positive account of the
current state of the law or a proposed account of what the law should be. There
may of course be disagreement about the current state of the law, and, once again,
disagreement is not a sign or symptom of BOS. But using naive criteria and
question-begging about the criteria, without argument, are signs. If the PC is
offering a proposed account, the PC should set forth the argument for why the
legal system should accept this account. In either case, the criteria should be clear
enough to permit reasonably apparent conclusions about the relevance of brain
evidence to those criteria.
Fourth, the PC must understand the positive/normative distinction, and if he
or she wishes to use brain findings as premises in an argument for legal change, the
normative reasons for preferring the change should be crisply identified.
All of the above is really just a “high falutin,” partially tongue-in-cheek way
of suggesting that people need to think more clearly and make more transparent,
logical arguments about the relationship of anything to criminal responsibility.
The question is why more PCs do not do this. I do not know the answer, but I
suspect that two primary culprits are at work: intellectual naiveté and ideological
blinders. Sophisticated, non-hand waving treatment of these issues requires a lot
of capital investment by lawyers in disciplines outside the law and by non-lawyers
in the law. Many PCs do not have the capital, but this is easily remedied by
appropriate investment.
Ideological blinders are harder to fix, and sometimes it is not clear what role
ideology is playing. Is the PC making an argument he or she knows is not the best
argument because it supports his or her position and it does (barely) pass the
“smell test”? I suppose that this is less objectionable for a practitioner than for a
scholar, although it is less objectionable even for scholars if they are openly
engaging in advocacy. Or, is the desire to achieve a certain result so important that
the PC does not even recognize that the argument deployed is weak? This is a
problem for anyone.
My impression is that most people who wish to inject neuroscience into
criminal responsibility assessments believe that the neuroscience must necessarily
be exculpatory. We have seen that this does not follow, and, indeed, even if
neuroscience could be demonstrated to be routinely relevant, it is a knife that cuts
both ways. Unless one makes the fundamental psycholegal error of believing that
causation per se excuses, it is clear that neuroscience might also be a means to
inculpate. One is reminded of the analogy to DNA evidence. For the moment it is
being used extensively to exculpate alleged murderers on death row, but as many
have pointed out, if inaccuracy is the primary criticism of application of the death
penalty, DNA could erode that critique and give new impetus to capital
punishment.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As the biological and behavioral sciences offer ever more sophisticated
understandings of normal and abnormal behavior alike, there will be constant
pressure to use their findings to affect assessment of criminal responsibility and
other legal doctrines. A lot will be at stake morally, politically and legally, and
much will be debatable. I hope, however, that this modest contribution will help
identify and ameliorate a pathological entity that can deleteriously affect the
debate.

